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NOTES 
Laws That Are Made To Be Broken: Adjusting for Anticipated 
Noncompliance 
Any mandatory legal rule1 is bound to encounter some noncom-
pliance, 2 which may arise not only from deliberate disobedience but 
also from such sources as lapse of rationality, weakness of will, in-
attentiveness, ignorance, and mistake. Noncompliance due to sources 
other than deliberate disobedience is generally not responsive to 
increases in enforcement and severity of penalties, and it thus seems 
clear that at least some noncompliance is inevitable. Moreover, 
while deliberate disobedience may, in theory, respond to increased 
law enforcement, the costs of eliminating it altogether, or even reduc-
ing it sharply, may often be prohibitive. If noncomplian~e cannot be 
entirely eliminated, and attempts to reduce it sharply are unacceptably 
expensive, then it is reasonable to formulate legislative strategies that 
minimize or prevent the societal harm that noncompliance may 
produce. 
This Note explores and defends a legislative strategy that has 
neither been clearly articulated by legal theorists3 nor methodically 
1. Mandatory legal rules are legal rules that impose an obligation to perform or 
refrain from performing certain actions. Not all laws are mandatory legal rules. The 
class of laws identified by H.L.A. Hart as "power-conferring rules" contains many 
examples of laws that cannot be subjects of compliance. See H.L.A. HART, THE 
CONCEPT OF "LAW 27-38 (1961). An obvious example is a law creating a court and 
establishing its jurisdiction. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act § 2, 11 U.S.C. § 11 (1970) 
(creating bankruptcy courts and establishing their jurisdiction). Other examples of 
nonmandatory legal rules are those providing definitions, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 3, and 
certain court-made legal rules, e.g., the rule of property law that a contingent re-
mainder is destroyed if the preceding estate is terminated before the remainder vests. 
See L. SIMES & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS 216-18 (2d ed. 1956). 
2. The term "noncompliance" is used throughout this Note to indicate any be-
havior that fails to conform to a legal requirement, whether or not the agent intends 
that the behavior not conform, whether or not the agent is aware that the behavior 
fails to conform, and whether or not the circumstances in which the behavior occurs 
would provide grounds for excuse or mitigation. This use of the term is not uni-
versally accepted. See Feest, Compliance with Legal Regulations: Observation of 
Stop Sign Behavior, 2 LAw & SocY. REV. 447 (1968). This Note is not concerned 
with laws that make knowledge of the illegality of an action a necessary element of 
the offense. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. Scon, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw, 
196, 201-02, 714-15 (1972); Wasserstrom, The Obligation To Obey the Law, 10 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 780, 782 n.4 (1963). 
3. While Henry Sidgwick never recognized the strategy described in this Note, he 
came close to recognizing the conditions under which that strategy may be profitably 
pursued: "IT]here may be rules of social behavior of which the general observance 
is necessary to the well-being of the c<;>mmunity, while yet a certain amount of non-
observance is rather advantageous than otherwise." H. SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF 
ETHICS 486 (7th ed. 1963). 
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pursued by practical lawmakers. 4 Most laws are introduced with the 
expectation that they will sometimes be broken, but it is generally 
-thought that noncompliance diminishes the utility of laws. 11 It is 
possible, however, to design laws the utility of which is actually 
enhanced by a certain amount of noncompliance. As a coroUary, 
it can ·be shown that it is rational, under some circumstances, for a 
legislature to enact laws0 that are not just expected but are intended 
to be broken with a certain frequency, by a certain portion of the 
population or to a certain degree. It is in this sense that the laws 
discussed in this Note are aptly characterized as "made to be broken." 
Generally stated, the strategy set forth in this Note is to investi-
gate the propensities of the population to fail to comply with laws 
regulating certain behavior, and then to design, accordingly, laws that 
make allowance for the amount of noncompliance expected. Typ-
ically, making such an allowance for noncompliance involves pro-
mulgating a rule that is stricter than that which one would otherwise 
promulgate if noncompliance were unexpected. The intended result 
of such an adjustment is that less societal harm would be produced 
by violations of the stricter rule than would be produced by inevitable 
violations under a more lenient rule chosen with (incorrect) expecta-
tions of universal compliance. Thus, laws should be constructed not 
as if they are to function in a society in which universal compliance 
will occur7 but should be formulated to achieve the best results under 
the level of compliance that is expected to prevail. 
Section I analyzes the conditions under which it would be rational 
to introduce a law that is made to be broken, and more explicitly 
delineates what it means -to say that a law is made to be broken. 
Section Il presents two hypothetical laws that are, it is argued, 
rationally made to be broken. In Section Ill, objections to designing 
laws to accommodate noncompliance are considered. Section IV 
then examines an existing law--obligating jurors to follow the 
court's instructions on the law-that is arguably made to be broken, 
and compares this law with the hypothetical laws offered in section 
Il. Finally, section V generalizes about the situations in which it 
4. While there is no evidence that lawmakers have consciously pursued the strat-
egy, they have sometimes produced laws that function very much like laws that would 
be products of the strategy. See note 54 infra for an example of such a court-made 
law. 
5. See J. ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 12-13 (1974) ("[L]egislators 
probably realize that many will break the rules but reason that many will observe 
them, so that something, at least, will be gained."). 
6. The discussion in this Note refers primarily to statutes, but it could be ex-
tended to administrative regulations and court-made legal rules. See note 54 infra. 
7. But cf. R. BRANDT, EnncAL THEoRY: THE PROBLEMS OF NORMATIVE AND 
CrunCAL Ennes 490 (1959) ("[O]ur actions, whether legislative or otherwise, 
should be guided by a set of prescriptions, the conscientious following of which by 
all would have maximum net expectable utility."). 
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might be fruitful to pursue -the strategy of making allowance for 
expectable noncompliance. 
I. DESIGNING LAWS FOR EXPECTABLE NONCOMPLIANCE 
The following analysis states conditions necessary and sufficient 
for rational introduction of a law that is intended to be broken: 
It is rational8 for a law-making body to introduce a law with the 
intention that it be broken, if and only if the law-making body 
believes and has reason to believe that: 
( 1) the law will encounter some amount of noncompliance if 
introduced;9 
(2) the law would be more effective in achieving or maintain-
ing a socially desirable state of affairs if noncompliance approached 
the predicted level, than if the law were universally complied with; 
and 
(3) given the existing tendencies for noncompliance in the pop-
ulation, the law is at least as good as any available alternative for 
achieving the desired outcome.10 
It is against this framework that putative examples of laws that are 
rationally made to be broken shall be evaluated. 
Condition ( 1) is designed to ensure that the legislature has some 
reasonable estimate of the degree of noncompliance the law will 
encounter. Although an expectation of some noncompliance is rea-
sonable with respect to any law, expectations that lack a reasonable 
degree of specificity will not usually provide a sound foundation for 
formulation of a law designed to be broken. This is not to say that 
predictions must be precisely quantifiable, 11 but estimates must at 
8. The term "rational" appears as part of the analysandum (the statement being 
analyzed) and is hence formally defined by the necessary and sufficient conditions 
of the analysans ( the statements providing the analysis). 
The following informal definition might also be helpful. The predicate "is ra-
tional," when applied to legislative decisions, may be read in two ways, either of 
which is acceptable for purposes of this Note. It may be read in the straightforward 
sense of "is not the product of an intellectual mistake" or "is not based on inadequate 
data or faulty inference." A more illuminating definition might be "is the product 
of a benefit-cost analysis whose projections are based on adequate evidence and rea-
sonably accurate balancing of all relevant factors." Since considerations of injustice 
and immorality are costs in a complete benefit-cost analysis, a legislative choice will 
not be deemed rational unless it takes considerations of this kind into account. Nat-
urally, not all rational choices are veridical ones. See generally J. RAWLS, A TuEoRY 
OF JUSTICE 407-24 (1971) (discussing the notion of "deliberative rationality"). 
9. While condition (1) suggests a quantitative measure of noncompliance, and 
while the common situation in which it is profitable to design a law to be broken 
will involve a quantitative prediction of noncompliance, there are situations in which 
a nonquantitative measure can be used. See text at notes 75-76 infra. 
10. Thus, for each societal goal, there may be a maximal class of laws, each 
member of which is superior to all laws not included in it, but no member of which 
is superior or inferior to any other member. Cf. J. RAWLS, supra note 8, at 409. 
11. It is assumed that any scientific approach to legislative selection will involve 
the accumulation of evidence to predict the degree of noncompliance a law would 
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least be specific enough to enable one to assert with some confidence 
that significant deviations from ilie predicted levels are not likely to 
occur. Without a reasonably specific estimate of noncompliance, 
the impact of a law made to be broken could not be ascertained, and, 
hence, it would be irrational to rely on such a law. 
A reasonable expectation of some specific amount of noncom-
pliance is not sufficient to create an intention that the law one enacts 
be broken. To introduce a law with the intention that it be broken, 
it is also necessary that one both expects noncompliance and actually 
considers such noncompliance preferable to universal compliance. 
Condition (2) is designed to ensure that the relevant intention is 
present and that -this intention is rational. If condition ( 1) is satis-
fied (i.e., the degree of noncompliance that a proposed law would 
encounter is known), the legislature can evaluate how effectively the 
law would bring about or maintain the desired social state. Further-
more, it can ask whether the law would be more or less effective in 
achieving the desired social state if, contrary to legislative expecta-
tions, the law were universally complied with. Unless the legisla-
ture reasonably concludes that the law would be more effective if 
compliance with it were universal, it would be irrational to prefer that 
the law be universally complied with rather than broken to the 
expected degree. 
It can be demonstrated, at least in theory, that there are condi-
tions under which it would be rational for a legislature to prefer less 
than universal compliance with a law. Suppose there is an action of 
type A, which is such that (i) if the number of performances of 
actions of type A approximates n, then society derives a net benefit, 
and (ii) the benefits to society from performances of action of type A 
decrease as the number of performances of actions of that type di-
encounter if it were enacted. The adequacy with which the law accomplishes its des-
ignated end will depend in part on the level of noncompliance it encounters. 
Predictions of noncompliance will typically be based on evidence about the be-
havioral dispositions of the population-its tendency to behave as the proposed law 
would require or forbid. Cf. Note, A Framework for the Allocation of Prevention 
Resources with a Specific Application to Insider Trading, 74 MICH. L. REV, 975, 977-
78 n.5 (1976). An important factor that influences the behavioral dispositions of 
a population is the quantity and quality of enforcement resources utilized to en-
courage compliance with the law. When a prediction is made as to the level of com-
pliance a law would enjoy if enacted, an estimate of the resources available for ad-
ministering and enforcing the law is relevant. See Stigler, The Optimum Enforce-
ment of Laws, 80 J. PoL. & EcoN. 526, 527 (1970). The estimate is determined 
by the general quantity of resources available for law enforcement and the supposed 
importance of the goal toward which the law in question is directed. Once it is de-
termined what resources are available for accomplishing some societal goal through 
legal regulation, rival alternatives can be laid out and predictions can be made about 
the expected level of compliance each would enjoy if introduced. Factors such as 
the behavioral tendencies of the population and the quantity and quality of resources 
available for enforcement are held constant for the comparison. The reasonableness 
of an expectation of noncompliance will depend on whether the expectation is 
grounded on predictions supported by adequate empirical evidence, 
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verges from n. Suppose further that, absent a law proscribing actions 
of type A, the number of performances would be considerably greater 
than n. Now, if a law proscribing actions of type A can be designed 
such that the deterrent effects of the proscription would cause the 
number of performances of such actions to fall to n, but not lower, 
the law would ensure that society derived maximal benefits from 
actions of type A. If the law were universally complied with, how-
ever, fewer than n performances would occur-a less than optimal 
result. Under such circumstances, it would be rational to prefer that 
the law encounter some quantity of noncompliance rather than that 
it be universally complied with.12 
Condition (2) embodies only a judgment about the comparative 
effectiveness of one law under varied conditions of compliance. Yet 
even if noncompliance with a law were predictable and the law were 
successfully designed to be most effective under the planned-for level 
of noncompliance, it does not follow that the Jaw would be more 
effective than other possible laws. Thus, a necessary third condition 
is that the proposed law be the best available alternative for achiev-
ing the desired state of affairs. However, condition (3) is far easier 
to understand than it is to apply, for the decision as to what con-
stitutes "the best alternative" requires consideration of numerous, 
often unquantifiable, and frequently conflicting factors. 
An obvious criterion for the selection of a law is the extent to 
which that law will bring about a desired outcome, such as highway · 
safety, safe drugs, or clean air. Also relevant; however, are the 
costs of implementation, for laws that might fully realize societal 
goals may sometimes be rejected in favor of alternatives that would 
effect the goal less completely but also less expensively.13 Moreover, 
it must be recognized that a law might be remarkably effective in 
bringing about a particular goal but nevertheless be unacceptable 
because it violates important principles of justice or morality. A law, 
12. It should be noted that the preference for noncompliance required for satis-
faction of condition (2) differs significantly from a more generally recognized prefer-
ence that lawmakers often must display under a traditional benefit-cost analysis. 
See Stigler, supra note 11, at 527; Note, supra note 11, at 978. It is frequently 
the case that the costs of Herculean enforcement efforts and draconian penalties nec-
essary to achieve universal compliance outweigh whatever additional benefits that 
would accrue to society if universal compliance obtained. The "preference" for non-
compliance in this sense may be more accurately translated as "settle for." The im-
plication under such analysis is that gratuitous increases in compliance should be wel-
comed. In contrast, when a law is made to be broken in accordance with the strat-
egy set forth in this Note, an increase in compliance would be unwelcome even if 
it came gratuitously, for an increase in compliance above n would diminish the ef-
fectiveness of the law. 
13. One reason why per se rules are sometimes preferred, illustratively in the 
antitrust field, is that alternatives requiring case-by-case determinations are admin-
istratively too expensive. See E. GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND EcoN0MICS 187 
(1976); A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF nm UNITED SrATBS OF AMERICA 434-
40 (1970), 
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for example, that sought to control population growth by calling for 
the extermination of a certain percentage of the population per year 
would be plainly unacceptable despite its obvious effectiveness. 
At the same time, it is important to emphasize that a violation 
of principles of justice or morality-even important principles-may 
not in itself be sufficient to render a law unacceptable, though certain 
principles may be so heavily weighted that any law that violated them 
would be almost conclusively unacceptable. After all, the conse-
quences of failing to bring about or prevent certain states of affairs 
might be so catastrophic that even important principles would have 
to be overridden.14 Hence, any injustice or moral objectionability 
associated with a law should be considered as merely one of several 
factors to be included as a cost in a benefit-cost analysis of the law .. 
Whether a law is, in fact, the best alternative will depend on a deter-
mination of the importance of the goal it is designed to achieve, the 
effectiveness with which it brings about that goal, the degree of 
injustice it creates, the extent to which it offends morality, and the 
comparative effectiveness, justness, and moral offensiveness of other 
available alternatives for achieving the same goal.1t1 Even if a law 
that is made to be broken creates injustice or offends morality, this 
does not mean that it is not the best of available alternatives. 
In summary, condition ( 1) requires that an estimate be avail-
able of the degree of noncompliance that will attach to a law if it is 
introduced. Condition (2) specifies when it would be rational to 
prefer that a law be broken to the estimated degree rather than uni-
versally complied with. Condition (3) establishes the circumstances 
under which the introduction of such a law would be rational-
namely, when a benefit-cost analysis would select it over available 
alternatives. In making this selection, consideration is to be given 
not just to those features of the proposed laws that bear on their 
effectiveness, but also those features that are relevant to their just-
ness and moral offensiveness. A law is rationally made to be broken 
if and only if it meets all three conditions. 
Il. HYPOTHETICAL LAWS THAT ARE MADE To BE BROKEN 
The previous section established a conceptual framework for the 
identification and assessment of laws that are made to be broken. 
14. The Supreme Court seems to have engaged in such balancing in upholding 
the exclusion of Japanese-Americans from certain areas in a wartime situation. See 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
15. The absence of a precise formula for balancing these factors does not pre-
clude sensible balancing in particular cases. Principles of benefit-cost analysis, with 
all their vagaries, remain applicable to the determination. See generally E. MISHAN, 
ECONOMICS FOR SocIAL DECISIONS: ELEMENTS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (1973); 
P. MUSGRAVE & R. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY & PRACTICE 134-84 
(1973); Priest & Turven, Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Survey, ECON, J. 683-735 (1965), 
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To illustrate the acceptability of this strategy, this section sets 
forth two examples of laws that are, it is argued, rationally made to be 
broken. The first example-a highway speed limit-is a law that is 
optimally effective if the population as a group departs from the law 
to a certain degree. The effectiveness of the second hypothetical 
law-one against hunting-is dependent, not upon the degree to 
which people depart from the law, but upon the total number of acts 
in violation of the law. 
Suppose that the optimal maximum speed of vehicles on a par-
ticular highway has been calculated to be fifty-five miles per hour. 
Assume also that past experience indicates that, given the maximum 
penalties deemed appropriate for speeding violations, 16 and given the 
limited resources available for policing the highways, drivers tend to 
exceed posted speed limits by ten per cent.17 To obtain the optimal 
traffic flow, therefore, the speed limit could be posted at fifty miles 
per hour and enforced as vigilantly as any other speed limit, under a 
speeding statute that might take the following form: 
It shall be unlawful to drive on highway X at speeds in excess of 
fifty miles per hour. Those who do so are subject to penalty P.18 
The result of introducing this law is that the common travel 
speed of drivers would be fifty-five miles per hour, and -traffic flow 
would be maintained at the optimal level. Quite clearly, this speed-
ing law has been made to be broken. The law reaches peak effective-
ness when many drivers depart from it to a certain degree; if there 
were universal compliance (i.e., if no driver exceeded fifty miles per 
hour), the effectiveness of the law would diminish. 
Given the facts assumed in this example, conditions (1) and (2) 
16. Most legal theorists accept some upper limit on the severity of sanctions that 
may be imposed for various offenses-whether on purely retributivist, purely utili-
tarian, or hybrid grounds. See, e.g., I. KANT, THE PHn.osoPHY OF LAw 194 (1887) 
(retributivist position that punishment must vary with nature and gravity of crime); 
J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 179-
80 (1970) (utilitarian position that a principle of "frugality" must be used in impos-
ing penalties since punishment is a cost, not only to punished offenders, but to society 
as a whole); Stigler, supra note 11, at 528-29 (utilitarian position that considerations 
of marginal deterrence limit the severity of penalties for all but the most objection-
able offenses); F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE 35 (1973) (hybrid theory 
employing "the retributive notion of appropriateness as fixing an upper limit to the 
range within which penalties may be selected on utilitarian grounds"). 
17. This hypothetical example serves heuristic purposes only; it is not intended 
to reflect the complex factors actually taken into account in determining optimal 
speed limits. A more realistic case would consider optimal speed distributions rather 
than a uniform speed, for disparities in speed among large groups of vehicles are in• 
evitable. A central objective of traffic flow engineers is to produce a narrow speed 
distribution curve, for danger of collision is minimized when disparities in speed are 
minimized. For a comprehensive discussion of many of the factors influencing traffic 
flow and of a description of a widely used technique for setting speed limits, see K. 
JOSCELYN & R. JoNES, MAXIMUM SPEED LIMITS: FINAL REPORT (1970). 
18. Pis the maximum penalty deemed conscionable for speeding violations. 
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are satisfied.19 It can also be shown that the hypothetical speeding 
law is superior to obvious alternatives and thus satisfies condition 
(3). Posting the speed limit at fifty-five miles per hour and greatly 
increasing enforcement of the law would be the most obvious alterna-
tive. However, since enforcement resources are, by hypothesis, 
limited, 20 ,the costs of achieving substantial compliance may be pro-
hibitive. Increasing penalties for speeding is not possible since it 
has been assumed that penalties already approach the greatest degree 
of severity deemed appropriate for violations of this kind. 21 Failing 
to impose penalties under the fifty-miles-per-hour statute until drivers 
exceed fifty-five miles per hour would be unworkable since one factor 
that leads drivers to exceed posted speed limits by only ten per cent is 
their perception of the likelihood that they will be penalized. 
Finally, such technological strategies as requiring installation of 
governors on engines that would prevent vehicles from reaching 
speeds greater than fifty-five miles per hour might be undesirable 
because on other highways the optimally maximum speed could be 
greater than fifty-five miles per hour. From the point of view of 
effectiveness, then, rthis speeding law appears to be a rational choice. 22 
Objections based on moral or ethical grounds are considered in section 
m. 
Adoption of a law that is made to be broken may be rational, 
not only when it is predicted that people will depart from the law to 
a certain degree, but also when it is predicted that a certain number 
of acts of noncompliance will occur-that is, when some portion of 
the population will comply and some portion will not. For example, 
consider a herd of animals that produces a beneficial environmental 
impact so long as its size remains within certain bounds. Let n and 
m be the lower and upper bound, respectively, between which bene-
fits are produced. Suppose that if unrestricted hunting were per-
mitted the herd size would fall below n, but that if no hunting took 
place the number of animals would exceed m. Consider the impact 
of introducing a proscription on hunting such as the following: 
19. See text at note 9 supra. 
20. See text at note 17 supra. 
21. See text at note 18 supra. 
22. It might be contended that use of license suspension or revocation would obvi-
ate the need for resorting to a law such as the one proposed. However, even if con-
ditions were such that suspension or revocation needed to be incorporated into the 
penalty, these measures should be seen as complementing rather than replacing the 
law. Secondly, it is not clear that license suspension and revocation are effective de-
terrents to speeding. See R. COPPIN & G. VAN OLDENBECK, DRIVING UNDER SusPEN• 
SION AND REVOCATION: REPORT TO TIIE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VE• 
HICLES (1965); Campbell & Ross, The Connecticut Crackdown on Speeding, 3 LAW 
& SocY. REV. 55 (1968); Hricko, Driver License Suspension: A Paper Tiger, 1iIE 
POLICE CHIEF, Feb. 1970, at 20-24. 
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It shall be unlawful to hunt animals of species Y. Poachers are 
subject to penalty P.23 
If everyone could be expected to comply with this law, then it 
would be irrational to introduce it, for the herd size would grow 
beyond m. Assume, however, that some persons are expected to 
disregard the poaching law, and that the projected class of poachers 
can be predicted to kill just that number of animals sufficient to 
maintain herd size between n and m. Under such circumstances the 
poaching law would be an effective means for maintaining the opti-
mal herd size. The poaching law would behave as a law th~t is 
made to be broken, for it would attain peak effectiveness when a 
certain number of acts of noncompliance occurred. The details of 
this example could be expanded to show that the poaching law is 
more effective than natural alternatives. 24 
Ill. CONSIDERATION OF ETHICAL OBJECTIONS 
It has been shown above that our hypothetical laws are more 
effective than available alternatives for accomplishing the social 
objectives toward which they are directed. However, it remains to be 
considered whether these laws should nevertheless be rejected on ethi-
cal grounds. One possible contention is that at least some acts of non-
compliance are beneficial to society, and that punishment of such 
acts is therefore unjust. A second possible objection is that it is 
unfair to those who conscientiously obey the law to have to forgo 
certain activities because the law has been adjusted for a degree of 
noncompliance. Finally, it might be argued that it is inherently 
23. P is the maximum penalty deemed conscionable for poaching violations. 
24. One alternative would be to permit hunting only seasonally. However, pour-
ing enforcement resources into the prohibited season might be unworkable because 
enforcement resources are too limited for effective seasonal enforcement. Permitting 
hunting but imposing limits on the number of animals each hunter may kill might 
fail for similar reasons. The very tendencies toward noncompliance that lead persons 
to poach might also lead them to take more than the specified share. More interest-
ing is the alternative _of initiating a licensing system and using fees to increase en-
forcement resources. Income from fees might increase enforcement somewhat, but 
it is unlikely that poaching would be eliminated completely. Suppose that the num-
ber of licenses issued were exactly that number necessary to maintain the herd at 
the desired level, provided that only those persons with licenses hunted. It would 
still be necessary to centend with those who continued to hunt without a license. It 
cannot be assumed that all and only those persons who would become poachers would 
purchase licenses if given the opportunity. Unlicensed hunters might then contribute 
to the killing of too many animals. Suppose instead that fewer licenses were issued 
in order to make allowance for unlicensed hunting. Then the combined killings by 
licensed and unlicensed hunters would yield the optimal herd size. But this is not 
a genuine alternative to the poaching law for it is tantamount to introducing yet an-
other law that is made to be broken-the law that only those who purchase licenses 
may hunt. That law would not be effective unless it were sometimes broken, for in 
order to obtain a sufficient number of killings, some unlicensed hunting would be nec-
essary. Lottery systems or taxation systems are subject to similar criticisms. 
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unacceptable to pass a law •the intent of which is at variance with its 
explicit language. 
A. Punishing Beneficial Actions 
The first question to be considered is whether it is unfair to 
punish persons for actions that produce a net benefit to society. In 
the case of the speeding law, persons who drive at fifty-five miles per 
hour are contributing to the desired traffic flow but at the same time 
are exposed to the risk of penalties for exceeding the posted speed of 
fifty miles per hour. Similarly, those who violate the poaching law 
may contribute to the optimal herd size but are still exposed to the risk 
of punishment. 
Despite an intuitive appeal, objections based on this rationale 
will not withstand close scrutiny. First, one must distinguish between 
actions that are benevolently undertaken and actions that have bene-
ficial consequences. An action is beneficial if it produces net bene-
fits for society; an action is benevolent if it is performed with the 
intention that it benefit society, whether or not it actually does so. 26 
Not every action that is in fact beneficial to society is intended to be 
so; one might act out of selfishness, negligence, or even malevolence, 
but the act might tum out to have beneficial consequences. 
There is nothing morally improper about punishing persons for 
actions that have merely beneficial consequences.26 For example, 
suppose that A detains B while robbing him, and thereby saves B 
from a fatal accident. Punishment of A would be proper although 
a net benefit is produced by one of the very acts-forcible detention-
that makes A liable to punishment. 27 Moreover, punishment is 
arguably proper even where no trace of "moral culpability" is pres-
ent. 28 Strict criminal liability might be imposed on a grocer who 
25. G.E. Moore drew a similar distinction between acts that are "right" and acts 
that are done for good motives, arguing that the rightness or wrongness of an act 
is determined by its actual consequences. Moore's use of this distinction is not in-
compatible with the use made of the distinction in this Note, for Moore separated 
questions about the rightness or wrongness of an act from questions about whether 
or not the agent should be praised or blamed for the act. See G. MOORE, Ennes 
170-91 (1912). 
26. Cf. Fletcher, The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: A Reply to Mr. Robin-
son, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 293 (1975). But see Robinson, A Theory of luslificatio11: 
Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 267 
(1975). 
27. Fletcher poses this hypothetical: 
Suppose that R impermissibly takes S's car for a ride. Unbeknownst both to 
R and S, the car is loaded with explosives timed to detonate in two hours. R 
leaves the car on a country road, where it explodes, injuring no one. If he had 
not taken the car it would have exploded in a crowded neighborhood, probably 
killing several people. Is R guilty of joyriding? 
Fletcher, supra note 26, at 299. 
28. See United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1008 (4th Cir. 1969) ("[I]t 
is commonly conceded that the exercise of moral judgment based upon individual 
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unwittingly sells tainted mushrooms that kill a potential mass 
murderer. 20 Thus, whether or not punishment of benevolent actions 
is always or ever improper, 30 the fact that an action has beneficial 
consequences is not by itself a sufficient ground for refusing to 
punish it. 
Even if punishment of beneficial actions is not morally objection-
able, it might nevertheless be maintained that, on purely utilitarian 
grounds, such punishment is irrational. This position rests on a 
confusion between the justification for punishment of a particular act 
and the justification for a general practice of punishing actions of a 
certain kind. 31 In framing a rule prohibiting actions of a certain 
kind, a legislature should not calculate the utility that each isolated 
performance of an action of that kind would have. 32 Rather, when 
regulation of behavior of a certain kind is contemplated, the relevant 
consideration is a comparison between the collective consequences 
of actions of that kind that would occur if no regulation were intro-
standards does not carry with it legal justification or immunity from punishment for 
breach of the law") (footnotes omitted); Feinberg, On Justifying Legal Punishment, 
in C. FREIDRICH, NOMOS Ill: RESPONSIBIL11Y 156-57 (1960). 
29. See generally R. BRANDT, supra note 7, at 487; Wasserstrom, Strict Liability 
ill the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV. 731 (1960). 
30. Punishment of benevolent actions is not necessarily improper. If a person 
assassinates the President out of a sincere belief that this is best for the nation, his 
good motives do not make his punishment improper. The Supreme Court has ex-
plicitly stated that the presence of both good motives and beneficial effects is not 
a sufficient condition to excuse liability: 
The [law cannot] be evaded by good motives. The law is its own measure of 
right and wrong, of what it permits, or forbids, and the judgment of the courts 
cannot be set up against it in a supposed accommodation of its policies with the 
good intentions of the parties, and, it may be, of some good results. 
Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 49 (1926). Even if there 
is some reluctance to punish benevolent actions, one should not have qualms about 
punishing those who violate the proposed speeding or poaching law. It is unrealistic 
to suppose that speeding and poaching will usually result from benevolent rather than 
selfish motives. See Cramton, Driver Behavior and Legal Sanctions: A Study of 
Deterrence, 67 MICH. L. REV. 421, 432 (1969). Thus, the actions of those who vio-
late these laws are merely beneficial, and the fact that an action is beneficial is in-
sufficient for withholding punishment. 
31. See Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REV. 3-32 (1955). 
While Rawls has been especially influential in popularizing the distinction, many 
philosophers have independently identified it. See, e.g., S. TOULMIN, THE PLACE OF 
REASON IN ETHICS (1950); Quinton, On Punishment, 14 ANALYSIS 133-42 (1954); 
Mabbot, Punishment, 48 MIND 152 (1939); Feinberg, supra note 28, at 161 n.5. 
Criticisms of some interpretations of Rawls' distinction between justifying practices 
and justifying particular actions falling under them may be found in D. HODGSON, 
CONSEQUENCES OF UTILITARIANISM 24-26, 31-32 (1960). More general criticisms 
appear in D. LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM 187-97 (1965); T. HON-
DERICH, PUNISHMENT: TuE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS 51-75 (1969). 
32. See J. AUSTIN, 1 LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 114 (5th ed. 1885) ("If we 
would try the tendency of a specific or individual act, we must not contemplate the 
act as if it were single and insulated, but must look to the class of acts to which 
it belongs"). 
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duced and the collective consequences of like actions that would 
occur under the contemplated regulation. 33 
In the case of prohibited actions that have "threshold effects"-
that is, actions that are not harmful unless they occur with substantial 
frequency34-a general practice of punishing those who breach the 
prohibition may keep the incidence of actions below the threshold 
and prevent isolated occurrences from having harmful consequences. 
This would be a result of the deterrent effect generated by the general 
knowledge of the practice of punishing violations. However, failure 
to maintain the general practice of punishing violations could result 
in an undesirable number of such actions. Deterrence generated by 
the practice would be undermined if, in each instance, the utility of 
imposing or failing to impose the punishment specified by law were 
calculated. Such a case-by-case calculation would be an entirely 
different practice from the one suggested here and would likely have 
a substantially different impaot on the behavior of the population. 31> 
Thus, any apparent increase in social utility gained in case-by-case 
evaluations might be outweighed by an increase in systemic disutility 
such individual evaluations produce. 
Consider the consequences of failing to maintain the practice of 
punishing violations of the poaching law. If the practice were aban-
doned, the incidence of poaching might then exceed desired levels. 
The crucial point is that each killing by a poacher when a poaching 
law is in effect is beneficial only because a limited total number of 
killings take place. Absent a general practice of punishment, each 
killing by a poacher would, when combined with the killings of other 
poachers, contribute to a reduction of the optimal herd size. It is the 
existence of a practice of punishment that prevents instances of 
poaching, detected or undetected, from having harmful consequences. 
33. Austin offers a similar but somewhat more simplistic suggestion: 
We must suppose that acts of the class were generally done or omitted, and con-
sider the probable effect upon the general happiness or good. 
We must guess the consequences which would follow, if acts of the~ class were 
general; and also the consequences which would follow, if they were generally 
omitted. We must then compare the consequences on the positive and negative 
sides, and determine on which of the two the balance of the advantage lies. 
J. AUSTIN, supra note 32, at 114 (emphasis original). 
Austin assumes that the relevant comparison is between universal performance 
and universal omission of a kind of act. However, it is possible that either alterna-
tive entails net harm, but that some intermediate number of performances produces 
net benefits. 
34. See D. HooosoN, supra note 31, at 167; D. LYONS, supra note 31, at 206-
13. 
35. Thus, if it became common knowledge that, in each case, courts would calcu-
late whether the defendant's action had net beneficial consequences before deciding 
to impose punishment, the expectations of the population about the probability of 
sanctions being imposed for discovered violations would be altered considerably. 
This might result in more people taking the risks and performing proscribed actions. 
See generally D. HoDGsoN, supra note 31, at 91-97. 
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Thus, the poaching law does not involve punishing independently 
beneficial actions but, as it were, transforms potentially harmful 
actions into beneficial ones through maintenance of a practice of 
punishing actions of that kind. 
A further source of uneasiness about enforcing our hypothetical 
poaching and speeding laws stems from the fact that the legislature 
wants people to break these laws and then punishes them for so 
doing. However, once one understands the nature of this legislative 
desire and at what point in time it arises, it no longer appears to be 
objectionable. Justification again begins with the observation that, 
if everyone could be relied on to comply with all laws, the strategy of 
adjusting laws for expectable noncompliance would never be pursued. 
But once the legislature determines, as it must, that certain activities 
will persist despite laws prohibiting them, then laws quite properly 
and rationally are designed and selected according to how well they 
function in the presence of such behavior. It is not simply that the 
legislature wants people to break laws; rather, given that it can 
expect noncompliance to obtain, the legislature employs the law that 
best minimizes the harm from such noncompliance. It is only after a 
commitment is made to a law that is made to be broken that the 
legislature wants the predictions on what that law is based to hold 
true.36 
Finally, there is nothing insidious about setting penalties and 
deploying enforcement resources in such a way that less compliance 
is obtained than otherwise might be had with more severe penalties 
and more vigilant enforcement: This practice pervades all lawmaking. 
Society is unwilling to pay the price of enduring draconian penalties 
and total police mobilization to ensure complete compliance with any 
law.37 The penalty for jaywalking is not life imprisonment, even 
though more people would refrain from jaywaking if it were. 38 
Thus, it is no objection to a law that is made to be broken that greater 
enforcement would further limit the class of lawbreakers. 
B. The Problem of Unfairness 
The second class of objections raised against the speeding and 
poaching laws is that they are unfair to persons who conscientiously 
36. The speeding law illustrates this point. Since it has been assumed in this 
Note that people will exceed posted speed limits by 10 per cent regardless of the 
posted speed, the speed limit chosen was that at which unavoidable noncompliance 
would produce the most beneficial results. While it is not desired that people exceed 
speed limits, when a law that is expected to be broken is selected, the legislature does 
not desire that people suddenly begin to comply with the new law. Total compliance 
would move traffic below the optimal rate. 
37. See note 16 supra. 
38. See generally Feinberg, Noncomparative Justice, 83 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REV. 
297, 311 (1974). 
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comply with them. These persons, it is claimed, forgo the satisfac-
1:ion of engaging in the activities that the hypothetical laws proscribe, 
and thus lose whatever benefits their participation in such activities 
would bring. Use of either the speeding law or the poaching law 
does indeed impose costs on conscientious persons that would not have 
been imposed if adjustment were not made for the behavior of non-
conscientious persons. Those who drive at fifty miles per hour solely 
out of obedience to the speeding law would undoubtedly be willing 
to drive at the optimal fifty-five miles per hour if the speed limit were 
so set. Similarly, those who refrain from hunting out of obedience to 
the poaching law lose all the satisfaction hunting might bring them, 
although such persons would be willing to cooperate in a lottery or 
some other arrangement that would give them a limited but fair 
chance to hunt lawfully; they are asked to give something up so that 
an adjustment can be made for those who are not conscientious. 
While it must be conceded that some degree of unfairness exists 
in utilization of laws that are made to be broken, this unfairness does 
not warrant abstinence from use of such laws. Some degree of un-
fairness associated with a particular law must be tolerated if elimina-
tion or mitigation of unfairness would seriously diminish general 
welfare or create equal or greater unfairness with respect to the 
impact of other laws. Thus, the costs of enforcing a law vigorously 
enough to extinguish all noncompliance ( most likely an impossible 
goal in any case) will often be unacceptably high, and concentration 
of enforcement resources to eliminate or sharply reduce unfairness 
associated with one law inevitably forecloses opportunities for reduc-
ing unfairness associated with other laws. Unfairness results when-
ever some persons do and some persons do not comply with a law 
that proscribes an activity that everyone has an interest in enjoying. 
It is unfair, for example, to those who refrain from parking in 
res1:ricted zones, or cheating on tax returns, or stealing, that others 
engage in such conduct. That society retains laws prohibiting such 
conduct despite its inability or unwillingness to eliminate such con-
duct altogether shows that society must, or is willing to, tolerate some 
degree of unfairness. Use of laws that are not completely enforceable 
reflects a judgment that fairer alternatives-alternatives that will en-
sure perfectly equal enjoyment ( or deprivation) of a desired benefit-
are either unavailable or unworkable. 
It will now be shown that, although it is unfair to those who 
comply with the speeding law or the poaching law that others do 
violate these laws and indeed are expected to violate them, fairer 
alternatives are either unavailable or unworkable. It makes no 
difference in this analysis of fairness that these hypothetical laws are 
premised on a legislative desire for such violations. The speeding 
law and the poaching law warrant separate treatment. The poaching 
law will be considered first. 
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The fairest alternative to our hypothetical prohibition of hunting 
would be an arrangement under which a random selection procedure 
were employed to determine which persons are legally permitted to 
hunt. Suppose it were first determined how many persons could be 
permitted to hunt without adversely affecting herd size, and that the 
requisite number of persons were then selected on a random basis. 
Such an arrangement would give everyone a fair but limited chance 
to hunt lawfully, and might be thought preferable to a complete 
prohibition on hunting. This arrangement, however, appears attrac-
tive only because it ignores the critical fact that not everyone would 
cooperate with it: Some persons would continue to hunt despite the 
fact that they were not selected. Because the combined killings by 
those who were and those who were not selected would deplete herd 
size below acceptable levels, it would be irrational to retain the ran-
dom arrangement without alteration. 
To adopt a random selection process that would not adversely 
affect herd size, it would be necessary to make allowance for the 
number of unselected persons who could be expected to hunt. Such 
a procedure would entail the selection of fewer persons than would 
have been selected if everyone could be expected to abide by the 
arrangement. Notice, however, that now the law permitting only 
those selected to hunt would just be another variation of a law that is 
made to be broken-a law that is adjusted for noncompliance. If 
everyone complied with this law, then too few animals would be 
killed and herd size would exceed desirable levels. 
This same {orm of argument applies generally to all lottery and 
rationing schemes -that are possible -alternatives to the hypothetical 
poaching law. 39 Thus, it is no objection to the poaching law that it is 
less fair ithan alternatives that would work well if everyone cooperated 
with them, because, in fact, it cannot be expected that everyone would 
cooperate with such alternatives. Given the empirical conditions of 
noncompliance that led to the adoption of the poaching law in the 
first place, any alternative purportedly fairer than this law would also 
be a law that is made to be broken. 
The question of the fairness of the speeding law presents different 
issues. First, if everyone exceeded the fifty miles-per-hour limit, 
then no unfairness would arise between those who did and those who 
did not comply with the law. Moreover, no driver could complain 
that the speed limit was set at only fifty miles per hour, for all drivers 
would share the blame for having led the legislature to set the speed 
limit below the optimal speed. 
If, however, some conscientious persons did abide by the fifty-
miles-per-hour speed limit, then an unfair disparity of position would 
39. See note 24 supra. 
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arise between them and persons who violated the law. No lottery 
system would be appropriate here, and the only possibly fairer alter-
native to the hypothetical speeding law would be a speed limit of 
fifty-five miles per hour. In that case, conscientious persons would 
drive at no more than fifty-five miles per hour. But since non-
compliance is expectable, others would still exceed the speed limit, 
and unfairness between these classes of persons would not be elim-
inated. 
Thus, the unfairness that exists under the hypothetical speeding 
law would persist even if an alternative were chosen that is not made 
to be broken. The unfairness results not from the operation of the 
law but from the behavior of those who fail to comply with speeding 
laws. 40 Moreover, setting the speed limit at fifty-five miles per hour 
would not only fail to eliminate unfairness to conscientious persons, 
it could conceivably pose greater risks of harm to conscientious and 
nonconscientious persons alike. There might, after all, be greater 
dangers to all drivers if conscientious motorists drove at fifty-five 
miles per hour and the average flow of traffic were about sixty miles 
per hour, than if conscientious motorists drove at fifty miles per hour 
and the traffic flow were thereby reduced to fifty-five miles per hour. 
It would thus be irrational to replace the hypothetical speeding law 
with a fifty-five-miles-per-hour speed limit. Finally, it should also 
be clear that nothing would be gained by setting the speed limit lower 
than fifty miles per hour. Some drivers would still exceed that limit, 
and everyone would lose ,the benefits of a faster but equally safe 
traffic flow. 
It may be concluded, then, that the problems of unfairness raised 
against the hypothetical laws are not attributable to the fact that the 
laws are made ·to be broken, but infect any law that enjoys only partial 
compliance. Thus, these problems of unfairness do not provide a 
sound basis for rejecting laws that are made to be broken. 
C. The Problem of the Disparity Between What the 
Legislature Wants and What the Law Directs 
A third set of objections to the speeding law and the poaching 
law focuses on the disparity between the behavior these laws expressly 
prohibit and that which the legislature actually desires. The speeding 
law prohibits driving in excess of fifty miles per hour, but the legisla-
ture wants drivers to exceed that limit; the poaching law prohibits 
hunting, but the legislature wants some hunting to occur. It might 
be argued that if the legislative plan is not disclosed, this disparity 
amounts to deception of the citizenry, and that deception in the legal 
40. In g~neral it is a mistake, however, to suppose that those who comply with 
a law get a poorer bargain than they would have gotten by joining the violators. See 
Schelling, On the Ecology of Micromotives, 25 THE PUB. INTEREST 59-98 (1971). 
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system is objectionable. Further, it might be argued that if citizens 
are indeed made aware of the disparity, thus avoiding deception, they 
will become more inclined toward noncompliance, and the predictions 
of noncompliance on which ,these laws are based will thus tum out 
to be inaccurate. To sum up this argument, if the legislative plan is 
not disclosed these laws are morally unacceptable, and if the plan 
is disclosed these laws are practically unworkable. Both strands of 
the argument are unsound. 
Assume, to begin with, that the legislative strategy of adjusting 
the poaching law for noncompliance is fully known. Persons aware 
of the disparity between the conduct the legislature has proscribed and 
the conduct that it desires would not, if they were rational, alter 
their behavior in such a way as adversely to affect this law. It may 
be supposed, for simplicity, that ,the population falls into two cate-
gories: 41 Holmesian badmen42 whose behavior is influenced entirely 
by the perceived costs and benefits to them of engaging in poaching, 
and conscientious persons whose behavior is motivated by a desire to 
comply with ·the law.43 
It is .clear ,that -the conduct of Holmesian badmen would not be 
altered by knowledge of the legislative scheme. They decide whether 
to poach by ·balancing the personal benefits to be gained from poach-: 
ing against the probability that tlley will be apprehended and punished 
and the severity of ithe sanctions to which they may be exposed. 
Holmesian badmen are entirely uninterested in the actual desires of 
the legislature, .and, hence, information about these desires will not 
influence their behavior. 
Conscientious persons, on the other hand, take themselves to be 
under an obligation to obey the law. Since the conduct the poaching 
law prohibits would be clearly known, conscientious persons would 
attempt to refrain from that conduct. Recognition of the disparity 
between what the law directs and what the legislature desires would 
not alter their perceived obligation to obey the law. Conscientious 
citizens recognize that their role is to follow legal rules, and not to 
substitute their personal assessment of the best means of satisfying 
the objectives of the legislature for ·the rule that they know the legisla-
ture has deemed the best means for satisfying its objectives.44 
41. In reality, most persons are neither thoroughly selfish nor wholly conscien-
tious. Thus, persons act sometimes from selfishness and sometimes from fidelity to 
law. 
42. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457 (1897). 
43. For purposes of this Note, conscientious persons are those who attempt to 
comply with the law, but who do not necessarily always succeed. 
44. There is, arguably, a danger that use of laws that are made to be broken will 
engender cynicism, even among persons generally inclined to be law-abiding, about 
the duty to obey such laws. Citizens could, after all, feel that the legislature is ex-
ploiting the conscientiousness of some and rewarding the disobedience of others. If 
such cynicism arose it might well spill over and affect the public's response to many 
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In the case of the poaching law, the legislature has determined 
that its objectives will best be achieved not by having a law that 
allows some persons to poach but by having persons attempt to comply 
with the law that completely proscribes hunting. This position is 
reinforced by the fact that a claim that one's violation of the law is 
motivated by a desire to further ·the legislative intent will not be 
accepted as a defense for failing to comply with the law. The claim 
of a poacher that by violating the law he was contributing to the 
optimal herd size or the claim of a speeder that he was traveling at the 
optimal speed would clearly be rejected. 45 Thus, conscientious 
persons would attempt to do that which the legislature has expressly 
identified as the legitimate course of conduct. It follows, therefore, 
that neither the behavior of Holmesian badmen nor the behavior of 
conscientious persons would be altered in such a way as adversely to 
affect the poaching law if they were fully aware that the law was 
adjusted for noncompliance. 
It can further be demonstrated that, even if deception were gen-
erated by laws that are made to be broken, rational persons would 
agree in advance to live under a legal system containing such laws. 
One means of accomplishing this is ·by determining whether persons 
other laws, for people might reason that if one law is made to be broken, any law 
might be so designed. Thus, a general lack of respect for the legitimacy of laws 
might be engendered. Whether such cynicism will arise is an empirical question, but 
certain steps should be taken to mitigate the danger. It is crucial that the legislature 
be absolutely open about the strategy it is employing, since people are apt to be re-
sentful if they believe they are being duped. It should be made clear that the legis-
lature is doing the best it can, given limited enforcement resources, to minimize the 
ill effects of noncompliance. Efforts should be made to explain why alternative regu-
lations would be less beneficial to society as a whole, and, perhaps most important, 
the legislature should appeal to conscientious citizens with the argument that their 
obedience is needed to compensate for the disobedience of incorrigible badmen and 
the accidental oversight of otherwise conscientious 'people. The danger of cynicism 
rests on possible misunderstanding of the legislature's aims: A conscientious person 
who understood what the legislature was doing would not be more inclined to disobey 
a law that is made to be broken. 
It must be remembered that the limitation on the decision-making role of the citi-
zen is an important feature of a system of legal rules. One of the chief advantages 
of a rule-oriented system is that, except in very extraordinary circumstances, it bars 
direct appeal to the utility of individual actions for determining the best course of 
conduct for a citizen to undertake. See Sartorius, Individual Conduct and Social 
Norms, 82 ETHICS 202 (1972). A justification for a system of legal rules is that, 
on the whole, better consequences will result if citizens attempt to follow the rules 
rather than to make independent computations about the best means for satisfying 
legislative objectives. Dangers of misconjecture about the ultimate objectives of the 
legislature and miscalculations about the best means for satisfying those objectives 
are apt to lead citizens to frustrate rather than further legislative objectives. This 
argument is but a special case of one traditional rule-utilitarian argument against act-
utilitarianism: that in practice act-utilitarians are apt to make many mistakes, and 
better results, on the whole, will result from attempts to follow a general rule. Com• 
pare Rawls, supra note 31, at 24, with R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION: 
TOWARD A THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 131-32 (1961). 
45. The propriety of rejecting a violator's claim that his noncompliance is justi-
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in what John Rawls denominates the "original position"46 would 
adopt general principles allowing incorporation of such laws into 
their legal system. Under ·this method of analysis, any principles that 
would have been chosen by persons in the original position are auto-
maticailly deemed just. <l7 
Persons in the original position are ignorant of their individual 
charaoteristics and the particular position each will occupy in soci-
ety. 48 They are, however, rational,411 and are aware of the general 
principles of the empirical sciences-in particular, of the behavioral 
sciences. li 0 Thus, they recognize rthat, in society, they and their 
fellows are subjeot to suoh common human frailties as lapses of 
rationality, weakness of the will, ignorance, mistake, and inattentive-
ness. Rawls argues that, since persons in the original position would 
want to protect themselves from -the consequences of these human 
shortcomings, they would select principles that permit paternalistic 
legislation and a penal system of some kind. 51 
fied because it satisfies legislative intent is already well established. A clear example 
may be drawn from the field of antitrust law. It is well known that one of the prin-
cipal aims of the antitrust laws is the preservation of competition. It is also well 
known that price-fixing is per se illegal. United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 
310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940); Keifer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 
340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951); Virginia Excelsior Mills v. FTC, 256 F.2d 538, 540 (4th 
Cir. 1958); Plymouth Dealers' Assn. v. United States, 279 F.2d 128, 132 (9th Cir. 
1960). While it is theoretically possible for an instance of price-fixing to enhance 
rather than harm competition, cf. P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 269-75 (2d ed. 
1974); E. GELLHORN, supra note 13, at 183 n.4 (1976), such an effect is no defense 
to a charge of price-fixing in any particular case. See United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 221 ("Congress has not left us with the determination 
of whether or not particular price-fixing schemes are wise or unwise, healthy or de-
structive"). 
46. J. RAWLS, supra note 8, at 11-22. 
47. As Rawls explains: 
[T]he original position is the appropriate initial status quo which insures that 
the fundamental agreements reached in it are fair . . . . [O]ne conception of 
justice is more reasonable than another, or justifiable with respect to it, if ra-
tional persons in the initial situation would choose its principles over those of 
the other for the role of justice. 
Id. at 17. 
48. Id. at 136-37. 
49. For the sense in which persons in. the original position are considered ra-
tional, see id. at 143 & n.14. 
50. Persons in the original position understand the laws of psychology, sociology, 
political theory, and economic theory. See id. at 137-38, 145. These laws are rele-
vant for the parties to consider in making their choice~. See id. 
51. Rawls writes: 
[T]hey will want to insure themselves against the possibility that their powers 
are undeveloped and they cannot rationally advance their interests . . . . It is 
also rational for them to protect themselves against their own irrational inclina-
tions by consenting to a scheme of penalties that may give them a sufficient mo-
tive to avoid foolish actions and by accepting certain impositions designed to 
undo the unfortunate consequences of their imprudent behavior . . . . 
Thus the principles of paternalism are those that the parties would acknowl-
edge in the original position to protect themselves against the weakness and in-
firmities of their reason and will in society. 
Id. at 248-49. 
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This argument can be adapted to show that persons in the orig-
inal position would accept principles permitting selection of laws that 
are made to be broken. The very psychological factors that Rawls 
cites as creating the need for paternalistic legislation create the need 
for laws that are made to ·be broken, for these are precisely the factors 
that give rise •to the inevitability of noncompliance with law. 62 To 
minimize the potential harm emanating from such noncompliance, 
rational ,persons might well adopt a strategy of adjusting laws for this 
expectable noncompliance. Any deception associated with such laws 
would not likely create greater impositions than other schemes for 
dealing with noncompliance. Thus, persons in the original position 
might prefer to have benevolent deception perpetrated upon them-
selves rather than suffer the consequences either of drastic penalties 
and overzealous law enforcement or of untempered noncompliance. 
Furthermore, persons in the original position lack sufficiently 
detailed information about their individual characteristics to know, 
for any given law, whether they will fall into the class of compliers 
or noncompliers. They do not know whether it is the ill-effects of the 
noncompliance of others or of themselves from which they must be 
protected. It therefore would be rational for them to choose a 
system that ensures that whatever noncompliance exists will not 
seriously diminish general welfare, since their chances of benefiting 
from such an ·arrangement would be significant. 53 
52. See id. at 143 & n.14. 
53. This argument should assuage many concerns about possible deception associ-
ated with laws that are made to be broken. It might be objected, however, that the 
argument seriously distorts the Rawlsian original position. According to Rawls, 
choices made in the original position must be made on the assumption that everyone 
will comply with the principles chosen, see I. RAWLS, supra note 8, at 8, for other-
wise, the system that is chosen will not be perfectly just. Id. at 8-9. Once a concep-
tion of the perfectly just system is identified, existing or proposed systems can be 
evaluated according to how far they depart from our conception of the perfectly just 
system. Id. at 9, 236. Rawls thus separates ideal theory, or strict compliance theory, 
from what he calls "partial compliance theory." Id. at 8. Partial compliance theory 
is concerned with constructing the best set of rules for imperfectly just systems-sys-
tems in which compliance with laws is not universal. For Rawls, then, laws that 
are made to be broken might have a place in partial compliance theory but not in 
ideal theory, for, since they will not be universally complied with, they cannot be 
perfectly just. If this account is correct, then the argument that persons in the origi-
nal position would allow for the selection of laws that are made to be broken must 
be unsound. However, it can be shown that Rawls' assumption of strict compliance 
in the original position is inconsistent with his own description of the circumstances 
of persons in the original position. 
Rawls assumes that persons in the original position know the Jaws of psychology 
and sociology. They thus know about irrational inclinations, weakness of the will, 
and other factors likely to give rise to undesirable behavior. Rawls uses this point 
to construct his argument for paternalism and for a penal system. He would have 
persons in the original position utilize this information in making their selections, 
Nevertheless, he fails to acknowledge that persons in the original position would pick 
principles that take account of the fact that whatever rules will be in effect will not 
command universal compliance. The psychological and sociological data with which 
Rawls endows persons in the original position, however, clearly indicate that uni-
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IV. JURY NULLIFICATION: AN ACTUAL CASE 
In previous sections, hypothetical examples of laws ·that are made 
to be broken were presented and general objections to this strategy 
of lawmaking were considered. In this section, it is shown that the 
rule that criminal juries are legally obligated to refrain from nullifying 
is an example of an actual law that is made to be broken. This rule 
is ·then compared to and contrasted with the speeding and poaching 
laws, and it is found that the prohibition of nullification, unlike our 
hypothetical laws, does, in fact, operate by means of deception. 
Finally, it is claimed that the retention and acceptance of the nullifica-
tion rule within our legal system despite its essential reliance on 
deception indicate that such laws as the proposed speeding and 
poaching laws, which are not essentially deceptive, would not be alien 
to our system of justice. 
In the federal courts54 and nearly all state courts, 55 it is a legal 
versal compliance will not obtain. Persons in the original position either possess this . 
information or lack it. If they possess it, then they will pick principles permitting 
paternalistic legislation and a penal system and laws that are made to be broken. If 
they lack this information, then they will not pick principles permitting any such leg-
islation. Thus, if the original position does not lead to the selection of laws that 
are made to be broken, it is internally inconsistent. 
It has thus been shown that there are neither ethical nor practical problems arising 
from the disparity between law and expected conduct that should precluqe the ad-
justment of some laws to allow for noncompliance. It might be added that intentional 
use of deception not recommended for this Note's hypothetical laws, see note 44 
supra, can readily be found, for example, in economic regulation by administrative 
agencies. In fact, one author has argued that as centralized economic controls in-
crease, the need for deception increases. See Fuller, Governmental Secrecy and the 
Forms of Social Order, in NoMOS II: CoMMUNI1Y 266 (1959). A legislative or 
administrative measure designed to produce a certain desired result for the economy 
might be undermined if the reasoning behind the measure were publicized. Devices 
J designed to stimulate some sharply sagging sector of the economy might be under-
mined if the observations or urgency that led to the decision were made public, for 
the very confidence needed to improve the situation might be lost. 
54. In Sparf & Hanson v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 101-02 (1895), Justice 
Harlan stated: "We must hold firmly to the doctrine that in the courts of the United 
States it is the duty of juries in a criminal trial to take the law from the judge and 
apply that law to the facts as they find them from the evidence." 
The circuit courts of appeal have followed this approach. See, e.g., United States 
v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973); 
United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Simp-
son, 460 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1972). · 
After Spar/, only one circuit court has acknowledged a jury right to nullify, and 
the acknowledgment was reluctant and limited. In Wyley v. Warden, 372 F.2d 742 
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 863 (1967), it was held that a provision of the 
Maryland Constitution requiring juries to be told that the judges' instructions are 
merely advisory was not inconsistent with the Federal Constitution. Judge Sobeloff 
branded the Maryland provision as unwise and cited criticism of the provision as 
"potent and persuasive." 372 F.2d at 745. 
55. The leading state case supporting this doctrine is Commonwealth v. Porter, 
51 Mass. (10 Met.) 263, 286 (1846), where the court stated: 
[llt is the duty of the jury to receive the law from the court, and to conform 
their judgment and decision to such instructions, as far as they understand them, 
in applying the law to the facts to be found by them; and it is not within the 
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obligation of criminal juries to refrain from nullifying the law. 
Oaths50 and instructions57 are directed at ensuring .that jurors believe 
that 1:hey have a legal obligation not to nullify, which is further evi-
dence that such an obligation does indeed exist. us 
If jury nullification is a breach of ·the law, it is a breach that is 
not, however, entirely unwelcome. There is considerable sentiment 
among courts59 and commentators00 that some instances of nullifica-
legitimate province of the jury to revise, reconsider, or decide contrary to such 
opinion or direction of the court in [a] matter of law. 
Today it is generally recognized that only Georgia, Maryland and probably Indi-
ana explicitly (through constitutional provisions) allow jury nullification. See M. 
KADISH & S. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY 49 (1973). The force of the Indiana 
provision was blunted in the last century by Bridgewater v. State, 153 Ind. 560, 566, 
55 N.E. 737, 739 (1899), which held that a trial court in a criminal case "is not 
required to neutralize the effect of its instructions by telling the jury that they are 
at liberty to disregard them, and to decide the law for themselves." Further discus-
sion of jury nullification may be found in Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 
52 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1939); Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right To Say No, 
45 S. CAL. L. REV. 168 (1972). 
56. For example, jurors in Michigan take the following oath: 
You and each of you do solemnly swear (or affirm) that you will well and truly 
try the issues joined in the cause now here pending, and, unless discharged by 
the Court, a true verdict render; and that you will do so solely on the evidence 
introduced and in accordance with the instructions of the Court; so help you 
God. 
MICH. GENERAL CT. R. 511.7. 
57. See, e.g., 1 E. DEVIIT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUC-
TIONS § 10:01, General Instructions before Criminal Trial, at 186 (2d ed. 1970): 
[W]ith equal emphasis, I instruct you that the law as given by the court con-
stitutes the only law for your guidance, and it is your duty to accept and follow 
it. It is your duty to follow the law as I give it to you even though you may 
disagree with the law. 
For examples of state court instructions, see CAUIC 1.00, at 2 (3d ed. 1970) (Cali-
fornia) ("It is my duty to instruct you in the law that applies to this case, and you 
must follow that law as I state it to you"); Kansas Jury Instructions § 51.02 ("It 
is my duty to instruct you in the law that applies to this case and it is your duty 
to follow all of those instructions . . • . [Y]ou should decide the case by applying 
the law to the facts as you find them"). 
58. Cf. Smith, Concerning Lawful Illegality, 83 YALE LJ. 1534, 1537-38 (1974) 
("Moreover, the jury is sworn to apply the law as it is given them by the judge; and 
one would think that their oath would have some bearing on what they are obligated 
to do"). 
59. See, e.g., United States v. Doughtery, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1972) 
("The pages of history shine on instances of the jury's exercise of its prerogative to 
disregard uncontradicted evidence and instructions of the judge. Most often com-
mended are the 18th century acquittal of Peter Zenger of seditious libel ... and the 
19th century acquittals in prosecutions under the fugitive slave law"); United States 
v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515, 519 (9th Cir. 1972) ("We acknowledge the truth that all 
such verdicts [where jury nullification occurred], especially when viewed in hind-
sight, cannot reasonably be said to have been undesirable"); United States v. Moy-
lan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1006 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 910 (1970) ("Con-
cededly, this power of the jury is not always contrary to the interests of justice."). 
60. See, e.g., Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REv. 12, 18 
(1910) ("Jury lawlessness is the great corrective of law in its actual administra-
tion); CENTER MAGAZINE, July, 1970, at 60 (comments by Justice Fortas) ("Jurors 
are not computers; sometimes they do come in with a verdict of innocence when a 
computer would say that the facts add up to guilt and that the defendant should be 
punished. We recognize and tolerate this as a worthwhile anomaly in the rule of 
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tion have desirable results, and •that, on the whole, the present system, 
within which disincentives to nullification are not so strong as to 
eliminate the practice, is preferable to a system that contains sanc-
tions sufficiently severe to eliminate nullification, or a system in which 
juries have a recognized right to nullify. 
A brief review of the justifications for retaining the jury nullifica-
tion rule in its present form will identify the reason why that rule may 
accurately be described as a law that is made to be broken. A sig-
nificant function that nullification may serve is that of "tempering 
rules of Jaw by common sense brought to bear upon the facts of a 
specific case."61 Many legal rules are rough instruments, constructed 
with general purposes in mind. 62 While a particular legal rule_ might 
produce consequences that are beneficial on the whole, par-ticular 
-applications of ·the rule might produce injustice. Not every case can 
be anticipated to which a rule should not be applied, and even those 
cases that can be anticipated sometimes cannot, for various reasons, 
•be -ar-ticulated as qualifications 10 the rule itself. 63 Through nullifica-
tion, the jury is sometimes able to prevent cases of injustice or hard-
ship that particular applications of an otherwise useful rule might 
create. 
Additionally, the jury has been portrayed as the "cutting edge" of 
legal progress. When juries regularly refuse to convict under a par-
ticular law, prosecutors are apt to lose incentive to prosecute under 
that law, and the law -becomes ripe for repeal64 or may, under some 
circumstances, become void. 65 The jury has also been said to pro-
vide a "safeguard against ,the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and 
against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge."66 Still another 
purported benefit of the jury's nullification power is that, through its 
exercise, juries ·are able to relieve the judge of the necessity of making 
law"); Comment, Jury Nullification and the Pro Se Defense: The Impact of 
Dougherty v. United States, 21 KAN. L. REv. 47 (1972). 
61. United States v. Ogull, 149 F. Supp. 272, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), ajfd. sub 
110m. United States v. Gernie, 252 F.2d {i64 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 968 
(1958). See United States ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 126 F.2d 772, 776 (2d Cir.), 
revd. on other grounds, 317 U.S. 269 (1942) (jury nullification "introduces a slack 
into the enforcement of the law, tempering its rigor by the mollifying influence of 
current ethical conventions."). 
62. Cf. Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of a Jury, 12 AM. JUR. SocY. 170 
(1929) ("[A]s a rule of law only takes account of broadly typical conditions, and 
is aimed on average results, law and justice every so often do not coincide."). 
63. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, 
J., dissenting) ("The drafters of legal rules cannot anticipate and take account of 
every case where a defendant's conduct is 'unlawful' but not blameworthy, any m:ore 
than they can draw a bold line to mark the boundary between an accident and negli-
gence"); M. KADISH & S. KADISH, supra note 55 at 630. 
64. See P. DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 160 (1956). 
65. See M. KADISH & S. KADISH, supra note 55, at 128-40. 
66. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). 
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morally compelling exceptions -that particular facts might indicate, 
but that the judge, in his special position as guardian of the law, 
ought not to be forced to make. 67 
The :benefits of the jury's ability to nullify enumerated above 
might appear compatible with either granting juries an explicit right to 
nullify or instructing juries about their power .to nullify. 68 However, 
it is generally ·thought that such alterations of the present system 
would be imprudent. The jury best serves its functions if nullification 
occurs on a very •limited scale, and it is feared that juries might 
nullify all too readily if they were granted a right to nullify, or were 
instructed of ·their power to nullify. 69 One way of indirectly ensuring 
this restraint is to erect barriers that will be overcome only in those 
instances in which jurors feel strongly "compelled" by conscience ,to 
nullify. 70 The more direct method of telling the jury that it may 
nullify so long as it feels compelled by conscience to do so might make 
•the jury more inclined to nullify than is optimal. 71 
Under the present system, the jury is impressed with the fact that 
it has a solemn obligation to apply the law as it is given -by the judge 
to the facts of the case. 72 Thus, when a jury contemplates nullifying 
it is likely to regard failure to discharge this obligation as a cost, and 
will be more reluctant to nullify. As a leading commentary stated: 
"The very technique of explicitly instructing the jury, without qua1ifi-
cation, that ,they are obliged .to apply the law as given by the judge 
helps ensure that they will impose the required extra surcharge on any 
67. Curtis, The Trial Judge and the Jury, 5 VAND. L. REV. 150, 157 (1952). 
68. See Scheflin, supra note 55; Kunstler, Jury Nullification in Conscience Cases, 
10 VA. J. !Nn. L. 71 (1969); Note, Jury Nullification: The Forgotten Right, 7 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 105 (1971). 
69. The court in United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 
1972), explicitly made use of these prudential considerations in reaching its decision: 
"The practicalities of men, machinery and rules point up the danger of articulating 
discretion to depart from a rule, that the breach will be more often and casually in-
voked." The court continued: "There is reason to believe that the simultaneous 
achievement of modest jury equity and avoidance of intolerable caprice depends on 
formal instructions that do not expressly delineate a jury charger to carve out its own 
rules of law." 473 F.2d at 1134. 
A commentator succinctly summed up the Dougherty position: 
While the power of the jury to nullify clearly exists, and while the exercise of 
that power can be beneficial in an appropriate case, the risks flowing from the 
misuse of the nullification power are too significant to warrant any formal com-
munication by the court to the jury that the jury has this power. In short, the 
court's refusal to sanction formal instructions to the jury as to its nullification 
power was intended as a brake on the criminal jury, a governor to avoid ex-
cesses. 
Comment, supra note 60, at 59. 
70. The court in Dougherty stated: 
[l]t is pragmatically useful to structure instructions in such wise that the jury 
must feel strongly about the values involved in the case, so strongly that it must 
itself identify the case as establishing a call of high conscience, and must inde• 
pendently initiate an act in contravention of the established instructions. 
473 F.2d at 1136-37. 
71. See M. KADISH & S. KADISH, supra note 55, at 65. 
72, See H, KALVEN & H, ZEISEL, ToE AMERICAN JVRY 498 (1966), 
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decision to depart from the rule."73 Thus, it is •thought that imposing 
on jurors an obligation to refrain from nullifying is preferable to 
making nullification legally permissible even in limited circumstances. 
And while the rule against nullification is valued for its tendency to 
limit 1he amount of nullification that takes place, it is also valued 
because the disincentives that it produces are not powerful enough to 
eliminate nullification altogether. 
It may now be shown that the rule against nullification is best 
viewed as a law tha:t is made :to be broken. If criminal juries have a 
legal obligation to refrain from nullifying, and if it is deemed desir-
able that criminal juries sometimes do nullify, it follows that it is 
deemed desirable that juries sometimes fail to discharge their legal 
obligation-that ·they sometimes fail to comply with the rule. If the 
prevailing view is correct, then this rule (prohibition of nullification) 
has greater utility if it is sometimes broken than if it is universally 
complied with, for if ·the rule enjoyed universal compliance, the 
benefits derived .from instances of nullification would be lost. In 
this respect, the rule against nullification is analogous to the hypo-
thetical laws presented earlier. In each case, a desired amount or 
mix of behavior is obtained through the operation of a legal rule, and 
in each case the legal rule operates optimally when some level of non-
compliance is manifested. Each takes expected noncompliance into 
account because the law selected or retained is different from that 
which would have been selected or retained if noncompliance were 
not anticipated. If drivers could ·be expected to observe posted speed 
limits, then the speed limit would have been set at fifty-five miles per 
hour rather than fifty mil~s per hour as specified by the hypothetical 
speeding law. Similarly, if juries could be expected to discharge their 
legal obligations uniformly; jurors would be told to apply the law to 
·the facts of the case except in those instances where doing so would 
create unnecessary injustice, rather than to abide by a rule that lacks 
such an exception clause. 74 
There are, however, important differences between the nullifica-
tion rule and the hypothetical laws. One difference between them is 
the measure of noncompliance employed. The speeding law is most 
73. M. KADISH & S. KADISH, supra note 55, at 64-65. 
74. Curiously enough, in arguing against the claim that juries would not abuse 
their nullification power if instructed of their power to nullify, the court in 
Dougherty drew an analogy that further highlights the similarity of the poaching and 
speeding laws: 
[A]dvocates of jury "nullification" apparently assume that the articulation of the 
jury's power will not extend its use or extent, or· will not do so significantly or 
obnoxiously. Can this assumption fairly be made? We know that a posted 
speed limit of 60 m.p.h. produces factual speeds 10 or even 15 miles greater, with 
an understanding all around that some "tolerance" is acceptable to the authori-
ties, assuming conditions warrant. But can it be supposed that the speeds would 
stay substantially the same if the speed limit were put: Drive as fast as you 
think appropriate, without the posted limits as an anchor, a point of departure? 
473 F.2d at 1134. 
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effective when many drivers deparit from it to a certain degree, and 
the poaching law is most effective when a certain number of acts of 
noncompliance obtain. In contrast, -the desired quantum of non-
compliance with the nullification rule cannot be measured statistically. 
Theoretically, this rule is most effective when noncompliance occurs 
-under limited circumstances-that is, when noncompliance would 
prevent injustice. However, these circumstances cannot be openly 
articulated to the jury,75 and the desired number of instances of nuIIi-
fication, though likely rather small; cannot be specified in advance. 
Instead, indirect disincentives to nullification -are employed to in-
crease the likelihood that juries wiII nullify in just those instances 
where ·they feel "compelled -by conscience" to do so. Thus, the 
desired degree of noncompliance is sought by means of a kind of 
"stress ,test," and predictions are made on the basis of rough generali-
zations about juror psychology. 76 
The most significant difference between •the nullification rule 
and our hypothetical laws is ·that the nuIIification rule relies essentially 
on deception-that is it operates by means of deception. 77 The nuUifi-
cation rule leads at least some jurors to believe that they do not have 
,the ability to nullify78 and arguably deceives at least some jurors into 
believing that the legal system regards all instances of nullification as 
undesirable. Moreover, ·this deception is not innocuous: it has an 
adverse impact on jurors. Although jurors are not formally penalized 
for violating the nullification rule, they are subjected to the informal, 
but no less real, penalty of guilt. 79 Thus, the same "problems" about 
punishing ,beneficial actions that arise in connection with our hypo-
75. See notes 69-73 supra and accompanying text. 
76. The Dougherty court went so far as to suggest an analogy between the impact 
on an experimental subject if he were told that he was being studied and the possible 
impact on the jury's behavior "if they are told of the consequences of their conduct." 
473 F.2d at 1136. 
Judge Bazelon criticized the majority in Dougherty for relying on unsupported 
predictions about how jurors would react to the instructions of the judge and argu-
ments of counsel: "[S]ince we have no empirical data to measure the validity of 
the prediction, we must rely on our own rough judgments of its plausibility." 473 
F.2d at 1141 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting). 
77. Judge Bazelon recognized this deception in his dissent in Dougherty. See 473 
F.2d at 1139. The majority, however, did not feel that withholding information from 
the jury about its power'to nullify was deceptive. See 473 F.2d at 1135. 
78. See Kunstler, supra note 68, at 71. ("[J]urors, almost without exception, have 
no idea of the extent of their power in this respect, and, under recent case law, they 
cannot be enlightened as to this power"). 
79. Cf. Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 758 (5th Cir. 1962): 
A conscientious citizen serving as a juror wants earnestly to do his duty. He 
is impressed, as he should be, 'by the awesome power and prestige of a United 
States Judge. In performing his role in the pursuit of justice, the juror wants 
to feel that he is as loyal, as conscientious, as fearless, as courageous and as 
objective as the Judge. He wants to be a good citizen. He desires, for at least 
this one time in his life, to measure up to what he senses and feels in the at-
mosphere of the courtroom. 
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thetical laws also arise in connection with jury nullification, for 
nullification is taken to be, in at least some instances, a beneficial 
action. 
However, it is critical to note that it _is the deception of jurors 
about ·the desirability of some nullification that contributes to the guilt 
jurors are likely to suffer upon nullification. That the nullification 
rule is accepted and retained in our legal system would seem to 
strengthen the case for the acceptability of laws like the speeding and 
poaching laws which, if -they engender any deception at all, do so 
accidentally. 
V. SCOPE OF APPLICATION 
The remainder of this Note explores the practical impact of the 
.theoretical strategy previously described and defended. It is argued 
ithat many varieties of -activity are appropriate candidates for regula-
tion by means of laws .that make allowance for expectable noncom-
pliance. 
Opportunities for applying -the strategy are presented, first, with 
respect .to kinds of activities such ·that the consequences of each per-
formance depend on ,the number of other performances of that same 
:type of activity. Some acts are not harmful unless a significant 
number of similar acts occur within a limited period of time. Our 
hypothetical poaching law was a paradigm of this sort, but many other 
regulations could be designed similarly. For example, walking on 
the grass in a public square is a classical example80 of an activity 
that might not generate harm unless a significant number of instances 
occur. An isolated stroll, or infrequent strolls, across the grass may 
do no harm and may be beneficial to those who cross, but when a 
great number of crossings occur within a limited period, then each 
-instance contributes to a collectively harmful result: The grass is 
destroyed. It should be noted that in the present case, noncompliance 
increases social -utility solely ·through the utility given to those who 
violate -the law. In contrast, noncompliance increases utility in our 
speeding and poaching examples through the benefits of optimal 
traffic flow and herd size that ·are spread generally among all con-
cerned, including persons who comply with the law. Nevertheless, 
in both cases, it is possible to maximize general utility through a reg-
ulation that does not eliminate all instances of a particular activity, 
so long as the number of performances of the activity remain slightly 
below the threshold of societal harm. In both cases, a total prohibi-
tion might result in maximum utility if the expected noncompliance 
80. See. D. HooosoN, supra note 31, at 167-75; Silverstein, Simple and General 
Utilitarianism, 83 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REV. 339,344 (1974). 
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were within certain limits. 81 This rationale may be .fruitfully applied 
to many other cases where there is a threshold number of perform-
ances ·below which no societal harm results. 82 
A second major -application of •the strategy is to cases in whioh the 
population, as a group, can be expected to depart from legal rules 
to a limited degree. Our hypothetical speeding law illustrated this, 
but many other cases exist. Just as people can be expected to drive 
somewhat faster than the posted speed limit, so people can be ex-
pected to stay out a bit past an announced curfew, to park a short 
distance beyond "No Parking Here to Corner" signs, or stop slightly 
beyond "Stop" signs. In cases of this kind, the degree of deviation 
from a chosen standard can be anticipated, and the standard can be 
adjusted in such a way as it:o ensure that actual deviations do not 
generate societal harm. 
A third area for applying the strategy includes cases in which 
both the number of acts of noncompliance and the degree of deviation 
from ithe rule are relevant. Pollution control and resource alloca-
tion are fertile .fields for application of the strategy. The harms or 
benefits of pollution or resource consumption are partially dependent 
on the total quantity of pollutant discharged and the total quantity of 
resources consumed, and these total amounts will depend on the num-
ber of parties polluting or consuming as well as on the quantities dis-
charged or consumed by each party. 
Suppose, for e~ample, n is the optimal quantity of pollution from 
a certain substance for a particular environment. Assuming that 
enforcement and inspection resources are limited and -that m units 
can be predicted to be discharged undetected, it would be rational 
in framing a regulation to set a legal limit of n minus m units. 
In this way, the combination of detected and undetected units will 
81. If n is the number of crossings below which no harm to the grass is produced, 
then, assuming that persons derive some pleasure or convenience from walking across 
the grass, utility would be maximized by a regulation that generates exactly n minus 
one crossings. Of course, n minus one permits to cross could be distributed if only 
those with permits actually crossed. However, in reality, it would still be necessary 
to employ a total prohibition since at least n crossings might occur anyway, due to 
noncompliance with the prohibition. Of course, whether a lawmaker would seek to 
obtain n minus one crossings rather than zero crossings will depend on whether the 
utility derived from crossing outweighs the general disruptive effects of having a lim-
ited number of illegal crossings and the unfairness created between crossers and non-
crossers. 
82. Similarly, the establishment of a total ban on parking in front of some pub-
lic building might be necessary even if a few vehicles could be parked in the area 
without creating a significant obstruction because, despite the total prohibition, some 
drivers would park for a period of time in the forbidden area. See generally Moore 
& Callahan, Law and Learning Theory: A Study in Legal Control, 53 YALE L.J. 
1 (1943). Another case of this kind might be the setting of a limit on the number 
of persons who may lawfully occupy an elevator lower than the number of persons 
who could safely occupy the elevator. Thus, if an elevator could safely hold ten per-
sons, it might be prudent to set the· limit at eight, in order to make allowance for 
those who would take and expose others to the risks of overloading. 
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equal n. Failure to discount n by m might result in too many units 
of pollution. Similarly, this approach may be used for resource 
allocation. For example, energy shortages have forced a reduction in 
the use of .fuel for heating buildings. 83 Regulations should be 
designed to ·take into account the number of households that will 
exceed prescribed limits and the amount by which each is expected to 
exceed them. Thus, if the optimal thermostatic setting is sixty-eight 
degrees, but most people are expected to exceed the legal limit by 
about two degrees, then it would be sensible to set the legal limit at 
sixty-six degrees. 
While there ·are many activities .to which the proposed strategy is 
applicable, there may be ·theoretical or practical limits to its applica-
tion. It -would appear that a necessary condition_ for using the 
strategy is that the activity regulated be not wholly devoid of social 
utility84-that it not be the case that no instance or that kind of 
activity could be beneficial. Otherwise, it would be irrational to 
prefer any noncompliance. 
It is not at all obyious, though, that there are any kinds of activity 
every instance of which is devoid of utility. 85 Thus, it is not clear 
that ,the strategy may be theoretically confined to any class of activ-
ities. In practice, however, it may sometimes be unprofitable to 
pursue the strategy. Such would be the case where it is highly 
unlikely ·that an appreciable number of beneficial instances would 
occur, or where the potential benefits from the activity are de mini-
mus. 
This Note has identified and defended a previously little-noticed 
legislative strategy and has suggested that this strategy is applicable 
to a wide variety of activities. It is obviously not proffered as a pan-
acea for all problems caused by noncompliance, but merely as 
another of the many techniques legislatures may employ to maximize 
the societal benefits achieved by legislation. 
Tohis Note has not addressed the question whether science can 
now :provide •the predictions necessary to carry out the strategy here 
described. The over-all effectiveness of a1;1.y scientific approach to 
lawmaking is necessarily limited by the predictive precision and 
reliability ·that current science is able to provide. Exploration of 
approaches that cannot be immediately implemented may nevertheless 
be worthwhile, for (a) it is advantageous to have available a frame-
work that can ·be utilized as soon as adequate predictive tools are 
developed, and (b) the existence of an apparently promising frame-
83. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1977, at 1, col. 2. 
84. See Posner, A Program for the Antitrust Division, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 500, 
at 504 n.10. 
85. See Griffiths, The Limits of Criminal Law Scholarship, 1-9 YALE L.J. 1388, 
1397 n.38 (1970). 
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work may influence the direction and speed of empirical research. 
Moreover, any delay between the articulation and application of a 
prospective strategy presents an excellent opportunity for refinement 
of tl:le strategy. Thus, whether or not current methodology is suffi-
ciently sophisticated to provide a firm basis for implementing the 
strategy of making allowance for expectable noncompliance, some-
thing at least has ·been ,gained by developing that strategy. 
